Why AI cannot be an inventor: a post-humanist rejection of AI as legal inventor

Why AI cannot be an inventor: a post-humanist rejection of AI as legal inventor

Journal article

1 online resource (pages 732–743)

Post-humanism is often understood as a framework that recognizes the entanglement of humans and technology, challenging anthropocentric assumptions by acknowledging distributed agency. However, this article adopts a critical stance within post-humanist thought to question the growing calls for recognizing artificial intelligence (AI) as an inventor under patent law. Drawing on the works of important post-humanist scholars, and examining the Dabus legal case, the article contends that while AI may be an active participant in creative processes, it lacks the embodied intentionality, ethical agency and contextual judgement required for legal inventorship. Following their insights, we argue that granting inventorship to AI would erode core legal principles, obscure accountability and risk commodifying creativity into mechanistic outputs. As a constructive alternative, the article proposes a model of supervisory inventorship, whereby only a human responsible for guiding or deploying the AI may be recognized as the inventor. Where the invention is entirely AI-generated without human creative input, such supervisory inventors may bear legal liability but should not enjoy full economic rights. This model preserves legal coherence and ethical integrity while acknowledging AI’s growing role in innovation.

Intellectual Property Law & Practice, 20, 11, 2025.

Oxford, UK : Oxford University Press, 2025.

Anglais

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External Online Journals > Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practise