Why, How, and When Do National Competition Agencies Support Supranational Regional Competition Regimes? : A Case of the COMESA Competition Regime.

Why, How, and When Do National Competition Agencies Support Supranational Regional Competition Regimes? : A Case of the COMESA Competition Regime.

Journal article

1 electronic resource (page 226-246)

A supranational institution is established by Member States and delegated with regulatory authority to make legally binding decisions over a specific issue area. Focusing on an inherently political and complex issue area – competition policy – this paper examines the conditions under which national regulatory agencies (NRA) support supranational institutions sharing competencies with NRAs in enforcing a specific policy area. Using rational choice theory, which argues that actors are instrumentally motivated by benefits accrued and costs incurred when supporting institutions, COMESA national competition agency (NCA) officials were interviewed to elicit what motivates them to support the COMESA regional competition regime (RCR) over time. The findings of this study have shown that COMESA NCA officials consider benefits accrued and costs incurred when working with the COMESA Competition Commission (CCC). Beyond the benefits and costs analysis, membership in the CCC Board of Commissioners, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoUs) between CCC and NCAs, the ability of the CCC to consider NCA’s concerns in its decision-making, and citizen support for the CCC have all driven COMESA NCA officials’ supranational roles towards CCC. This study calls for nuanced research that explores the bureaucratic cooperation between NRA’s sharing competencies with supranational institutions to inform legal, political and international relations research. Importantly, the findings inform research on how supranational institutions can invoke national-level support for supranational governance.

Crossref

GRUR International ; 74, 3, 2025, 2632-8550.

[Oxford, England] : Oxford University Press (OUP), 2025.

eng

https://academic.oup.com/grurint/article/72/3/231/6998505

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