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000050172 040__ $$aSzGeWIPO$$beng$$erda$$cSzGeWIPO
000050172 041__ $$aeng
000050172 24500 $$aGood Intentions Gone Wrong :$$bThe Copyright Act's Safe Harbor Provision and the Requirement of Actual Knowledge
000050172 264_1 $$aChicago, Illinois :$$bUIC Review of Intellectual Property Law,$$c2024.
000050172 300__ $$a1 online resource (pages 400)
000050172 336__ $$atext$$2rdacontent
000050172 337__ $$acomputer$$2rdamedia
000050172 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
000050172 4901_ $$aJohn Marshal Review of Intellectual Property Law,$$x1930-8140 ;$$vVolume 23, Issue 1, 2024, pages 381
000050172 520_0 $$aIn 2008, Congress enacted the Copyright Act’s safe harbor provision which called for more lenient treatment of mistakes in copyright applications. The enactment helped to close the loophole where a copyright application could be invalidated for a material mistake in the application, precluding a cause of action for copyright infringement and statutory damages. However, interpreting and applying the safe harbor provision has given rise to disputes among district and appellate courts. There is a split on what standard the statutes language requires to render a copyright application invalid. Under the safe harbor, in part, invalidation of a copyright requires that the alleged copyright holder included the inaccuracy “with knowledge.” Courts have been split on whether this language evinces an actual knowledge standard versus a showing that the alleged copyright holder included the inaccuracy with an intent to fraud or as some courts phrase it, the inaccuracy was included with a “scienter of fraud.” The most recent interpretation of the safe harbor provision was handed down by the Supreme Court in 2022 in a case named Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P. In this case, the Court side steps the dispute of the lower courts and interprets the safe harbor provision as requiring a showing of actual knowledge solely. This case note argues that the decision was flawed for various reasons, creates an impossible standard, and calls on Congress to amend the language of the statute and require that the safe harbor provision includes an intent to fraud standard as opposed to an actual knowledge standard.
000050172 542__ $$fhttps://repository.law.uic.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1528&context=ripl
000050172 588__ $$aCrossref
000050172 590__ $$aPublished online: 2024
000050172 650_0 $$aCopyright$$xLaw and legislation
000050172 7001_ $$aIgori, Dolapo,$$eauthor.
000050172 7730_ $$tJohn Marshal Review of Intellectual Property Law$$wJMR
000050172 830_0 $$aJohn Marshal Review of Intellectual Property Law ;$$vVolume 23, Issue 1, 2024, pages 381,$$x1930-8140.
000050172 85641 $$uhttps://repository.law.uic.edu/ripl/vol23/iss1/2/$$yonline version
000050172 904__ $$aJournal article
000050172 980__ $$aJMR