000050160 000__ 02473cam\a22003495i\4500 000050160 001__ 50160 000050160 003__ SzGeWIPO 000050160 005__ 20240906130626.0 000050160 008__ 240906s20242024enk\\\\\rb\\\\000\0\eng\d 000050160 0247_ $$a10.1093/jiplp/jpae049$$2doi 000050160 040__ $$aSzGeWIPO$$beng$$erda$$cSzGeWIPO 000050160 041__ $$aeng 000050160 24500 $$aThe anti-suit injunctions in patent litigation in China:$$bwhat role for judicial self-restraint? 000050160 264_1 $$aOxford, UK :$$bOxford University Press,$$c2024. 000050160 300__ $$a1 online resource (pages 734–742) 000050160 336__ $$atext$$2rdacontent 000050160 337__ $$acomputer$$2rdamedia 000050160 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier 000050160 4901_ $$aIntellectual Property Law & Practice,$$x1747-1540;$$v19, 9, 2024 000050160 520__ $$aStarting from 2020, the Chinese courts have actively participated in the jurisdictional battles for the standard essential patent (SEP) disputes, a pivotal development marked by the Supreme People’s Court’s inaugural SEP-related anti-suit injunction (ASI) in Huawei v Conversant. Subsequently, lower courts in China have emulated this approach by issuing ASIs targeting SEPs in the domain of information and communication technology. The present study highlights the features of the Chinese ‘act preservation measures’ by comparing them with the typical ASIs originally developed in the common law jurisdictions. This comparison reveals significant divergence in the factors considered by Chinese courts issuing ASIs, particularly in the context of cross-border patent litigation. The study aims at elucidating potential defenses that the respondents in SEP litigation may employ to contest the issuance of ASIs in Chinese judicial proceedings, with particular attention accorded to the principles of comity and public interest. The article concludes that the invocation of international comity and public interest in SEP litigation will encounter a formalistic assessment by the Chinese judiciary due to potential conflicts with statutory provisions and the lack of a more context-specific analysis. As a result, in the absence of supra-national mechanisms that would address the problem of parallel litigation, there appears to be little room for judicial self-restraint. 000050160 542__ $$fhttps://academic.oup.com/pages/using-the-content/citation 000050160 590__ $$aPublished online: 24-May-24 000050160 650_0 $$aIntellectual property$$xLaw and legislation 000050160 650_0 $$aPatent law and legislation 000050160 650_0 $$aPatents$$yChina 000050160 7001_ $$aSvetlicinii, Alexandr,$$eauthor. 000050160 7731_ $$tIntellectual Property Law & Practice,$$wJIPLP 000050160 830_0 $$aIntellectual Property Law & Practice,$$x1747-1540;$$w19, 9, 2024 000050160 85641 $$uhttps://doi.org/10.1093/jiplp/jpae049$$yJournal homepage 000050160 904__ $$aJournal Article 000050160 980__ $$aJIPLP