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000048245 008__ 230602s2016    sz|||||| |||||000|0 eng|d
000048245 035__ $$a(OCoLC)1393694842
000048245 040__ $$aSzGeWIPO$$beng$$erda$$cSzGeWIPO
000048245 041__ $$aeng
000048245 1001_ $$aSchütt, Florian$$eauthor.
000048245 24510 $$aScreening for Patent Quality :$$bExamination, Fees, and the Courts.
000048245 264_1 $$aTilburg :$$bTILEC,$$c2016.
000048245 300__ $$a57 pages
000048245 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
000048245 337__ $$aunmediated$$bn$$2rdamedia
000048245 338__ $$avolume$$bnc$$2rdacarrier
000048245 500__ $$aVol. 2016-036
000048245 500__ $$aThis resource was extracted from Tilburg University
000048245 520__ $$aWe develop an integrated framework to study how governments can improve the quality of patent screening. We focus on four key policy instruments: patent office examination, pre- and post-grant fees, and challenges in the courts. We show that there are important complementarities among these instruments, and identify conditions under which they can be used to achieve either partial or complete screening. We simulate the model to study the welfare effects of different policy reforms. We show that intensifying patent office examination, frontloading patent fees and capping litigation costs all generate welfare gains, while replacing examination with a pure registration system reduces welfare.
000048245 650_0 $$aPatent laws and legislation.
000048245 650_0 $$aPatents.
000048245 650_0 $$aEconomic development projects$$xDirectories.
000048245 7001_ $$aSchankerman, Mark,$$eauthor.
000048245 85641 $$uhttps://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/screening-for-patent-quality-examination-fees-and-the-courts
000048245 903__ $$aTILEC Discussion Paper
000048245 904__ $$aJournal article
000048245 980__ $$aBIB