000048121 001__ 48121 000048121 003__ SzGeWIPO 000048121 005__ 20230531201421.0 000048121 006__ m eo d 000048121 007__ cr bn |||m|||a 000048121 008__ 230530s2022 enk o 001 0 eng 000048121 020__ $$a9780197614433$$qeBook 000048121 035__ $$a(OCoLC)1260690864 000048121 040__ $$aSzGeWIPO$$beng$$erda$$cSzGeWIPO$$dCaBNVSL 000048121 041__ $$aeng 000048121 050_4 $$aKF2979 000048121 08204 $$a346.73048$$223 000048121 1001_ $$aSnow, Ned,$$eauthor. 000048121 24510 $$aIntellectual Property and Immorality :$$bAgainst Protecting Harmful Creations of the Mind. 000048121 264_1 $$aOxford :$$bOxford University Press,$$c2022 000048121 300__ $$a1 online resource 000048121 336__ $$atext$$2rdacontent 000048121 337__ $$acomputer$$2rdamedia 000048121 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier 000048121 5203_ $$aThis book argues that certain intellectual creations should not receive copyright or patent protection because they are harmful to society. It posits that the theories of intellectual property and the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution suggest this conclusion. The book responds to counterarguments: namely, that denying protection might increase the output of objectionable works; that other laws should address the moral problems; and that intellectual property functions better under a laissez-faire approach. After responding to these arguments, the book considers the roles of government actors in denying protection. It argues that courts should exercise their powers of equity to deny relief for works that are connected to unlawful acts of the rights-holder, and that courts should exercise their constitutional powers to deny protection for specific categories of harmful expressions and inventions. Next, the book considers whether Congress has constitutional authority to deny protection for works that it considers to be immoral. In concluding that Congress does have such authority, the book sets forth specific criteria that Congress should apply in exercising its moral discretion. Finally, the book considers whether denying intellectual property protection on moral grounds would violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. It concludes that principles of free speech afford Congress considerable discretion to deny patent protection but only narrow discretion to deny copyright protection. It also concludes that the Free Speech Clause is consistent with judicial denial of protection for the limited categories of works that fall outside the Intellectual Property Clause. 000048121 588__ $$aOnline resource 000048121 650_0 $$aFreedom of expression. 000048121 650_4 $$aIntellectual property$$xMoral and ethical aspects. 000048121 650_4 $$aIntellectual property$$xMoral and ethical aspects$$zUnited States 000048121 650_4 $$aFreedom of expression$$zUnited States 000048121 650_0 $$aIntellectual property$$zUnited States.. 000048121 650_0 $$aCopyright$$zUnited States.. 000048121 650_0 $$aPatents$$zUnited States.. 000048121 651_0 $$aUnited States. 000048121 830_0 $$aOxford scholarship online 000048121 85641 $$uhttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197614402.001.0001$$yView eBook 000048121 903__ $$aOxford Academic 000048121 980__ $$aOS