TY  - BOOK
AB  - We extend the results in Lissoni et al. (2013, J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 95, 49–69) on scientific credit misallocation, as measured by misalignment between authorship and inventorship recognition in patent-publication pairs. Extending the analysis to European data, we confirm that, other things being equal, the probability of exclusion of a scientific author from a publication-related patent declines with seniority and increases for women. In addition, we find that the senior scientists’ power to exclude other authors plays a more important role in explaining the patterns of exclusion than differences in authors’ attribution preferences. The unfavorable treatment of young and/or female scientists emerges in particular when patents are owned by companies or individuals, thus providing a warning flag on those institutional arrangements that favor company or individual ownership of academic patents.
AU  - Lissoni, Francesco,
AU  - Montobbio, Fabio,
AU  - Zirulia, Lorenzo,
ID  - 47928
JF  - Industrial and Corporate Change,
KW  - Patents
KW  - Intellectual property
KW  - Inventions
LA  - eng
LK  - https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dtaa029
N2  - We extend the results in Lissoni et al. (2013, J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 95, 49–69) on scientific credit misallocation, as measured by misalignment between authorship and inventorship recognition in patent-publication pairs. Extending the analysis to European data, we confirm that, other things being equal, the probability of exclusion of a scientific author from a publication-related patent declines with seniority and increases for women. In addition, we find that the senior scientists’ power to exclude other authors plays a more important role in explaining the patterns of exclusion than differences in authors’ attribution preferences. The unfavorable treatment of young and/or female scientists emerges in particular when patents are owned by companies or individuals, thus providing a warning flag on those institutional arrangements that favor company or individual ownership of academic patents.
SN  - 0960-6491 (Print)
SN  - 1464-3650 (Online)
T1  - Misallocation of scientific credit: the role of hierarchy and preferences.
TI  - Misallocation of scientific credit: the role of hierarchy and preferences.
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dtaa029
VL  - Volume 29, Issue 6
ER  -