000047821 000__ 02595cam\a22003255i\4500
000047821 001__ 47821
000047821 003__ SzGeWIPO
000047821 005__ 20240708150351.0
000047821 006__ m\\\\eo\\d\\\\\\\\
000047821 007__ cr bn |||m|||a
000047821 008__ 230213s2020\\\\nyu\\\\\\b\\\\000\0\eng\d
000047821 022__ $$a0960-6491 (Print)$$a1464-3650 (Online)
000047821 040__ $$aSzGeWIPO$$beng$$erda$$cSzGeWIPO
000047821 041__ $$aeng
000047821 24500 $$aThe case of the missing royalty stacking in the world mobile wireless industry.
000047821 264_1 $$aOxford, UK :$$bOxford University Press,$$c2020.
000047821 336__ $$atext$$2rdacontent
000047821 337__ $$acomputer$$2rdamedia
000047821 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
000047821 4901_ $$aIndustrial and Corporate Change$$vVolume 29, Issue 3
000047821 5203_ $$aWe build an equilibrium royalty stacking model that links the number of standard-essential patent (SEP) holders with the equilibrium quantity, price and cumulative royalty. We show that all observable implications of the theory are inconsistent with the data from the world mobile wireless industry. In this industry, the number of SEP holders grew from 2 in 1994 to 130 in 2013. Royalty stacking theory predicts falling or stagnant output, rising selling prices, and rising or stagnant quality-adjusted prices. By contrast, between 1994 and 2013 worldwide yearly device sales grew 62-fold, at an average rate of 20.1% per year, and both selling and quality-adjusted prices fell fast over time. Controlling for technological generation, the real average selling price of a device fell between -11.4% and -24.8% per year. Similarly, under conservative parametrizations, royalty stacking theory predicts royalty yields, which are more than an order of magnitude larger than the observed average cumulative royalty yield charged by SEP holders in practice, which hovers between 3% and 3.5%. A theory based on Lerner and Tirole’s (2015, J. Political Econ., 123(3), 547–586) within-functionality competition yields observable implications consistent with the observed facts. If all the technologies protected by SEPs have meaningful substitutes that cap the royalty that any SEP holder can charge, then the cumulative royalty is independent of demand parameters in the downstream market and can be as low as the observed average cumulative royalty yield. Moreover, if the product market is competitive and technological progress is fast, then prices follow costs, quality-adjusted prices protractedly fall, and sales grow fast.
000047821 542__ $$fhttps://academic.oup.com/pages/using-the-content/citation
000047821 590__ $$aPublished online: 2020
000047821 650_0 $$aPatents
000047821 650_0 $$aIntellectual property
000047821 7001_ $$aGaletovic, Alexander,$$vauthor.
000047821 7001_ $$aGupta, Kirti,$$eauthor.
000047821 7731_ $$tIndustrial and Corporate Change,$$wINCC
000047821 830_0 $$aIndustrial and Corporate Change$$vINCC 2020, 29(3), 827–853
000047821 85641 $$uhttps://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dtz074$$yRead the Article
000047821 904__ $$aJournal article
000047821 980__ $$aINCC