000042101 000__ 01128cam\a22002535i\4500
000042101 001__ 42101
000042101 003__ SzGeWIPO
000042101 005__ 20240708145900.0
000042101 008__ 200625s2020\\\\sz\\\\\\r\\\\\000\0\eng\d
000042101 040__ $$aSzGeWIPO$$beng$$erda
000042101 041__ $$aeng
000042101 1001_ $$aCarrier, Michael A.
000042101 24503 $$aRescuing Antitrust’s Role in Patent Holdup
000042101 264_1 $$a[Philadelphia, Pennsylvania] :$$bUniversity of Pennsylvania law review,$$c2020.
000042101 300__ $$a12 pages
000042101 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
000042101 337__ $$aunmediated$$bn$$2rdamedia
000042101 338__ $$avolume$$bnc$$2rdacarrier
000042101 520__ $$aThis Essay does four things. First, it explains why the Shapiro/Lemley article is important, particularly to situate today’s patent holdup debates in the larger context of transaction cost economics. Second, it raises questions related to standards organizations’ rules and antitrust law that the authors could more fully consider. Third, it offers additional support showing the radical nature of Delrahim’s position. And fourth, it opines on the nature of academic debate and its effect on antitrust enforcement.
000042101 525__ $$aPublished in : University of Pennsylvania Law Review
000042101 650__ $$aStandards
000042101 650_0 $$aPatents
000042101 650_0 $$aAntitrust
000042101 650_0 $$aHoldup
000042101 85641 $$uhttps://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3625799$$yView this resource
000042101 904__ $$aJournal article
000042101 980__ $$aBIB