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000042079 001__ 42079
000042079 003__ SzGeWIPO
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000042079 008__ 200625s2002\\\\sz\\\\\\r\\\\\000\0\eng\d
000042079 040__ $$aSzGeWIPO$$beng$$erda
000042079 041__ $$aeng
000042079 1001_ $$aLemley, Mark A.
000042079 24503 $$aIntellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations
000042079 264_1 $$a[Berkeley, California] :$$bUniversity of California,$$c2002.
000042079 300__ $$a93 pages
000042079 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
000042079 337__ $$aunmediated$$bn$$2rdamedia
000042079 338__ $$avolume$$bnc$$2rdacarrier
000042079 520__ $$a"In the end, I hope to convince the reader of four things. First, SSO rules governing intellectual property fundamentally change the way in which we must approach the study of intellectual property. It is not enough to consider IP rights in a vacuum; we must consider them as they are actually used in practice. And that means considering how SSO rules affect IP incentives in different industries. Second, there is a remarkable diversity among SSOs in how they treat IP rights. This diversity is largely accidental, and does not reflect conscious competition between different policies. Third, the law is not well designed to take account of the modern role of SSOs. Antitrust rules may unduly restrict SSOs even when those organizations are serving procompetitive ends. And enforcement of SSO IP rules presents a number of important but unresolved problems of contract and intellectual property law, issues that will need to be resolved if SSO IP rules are to fulfill their promise of solving patent holdup problems."
000042079 525__ $$aPublished in : California Law Review 1889 (2002)
000042079 650__ $$aPatent
000042079 650_0 $$aStandards
000042079 650_0 $$aNetworks
000042079 650_0 $$aAntitrust
000042079 650_0 $$aIntellectual property
000042079 650_0 $$aInnovation
000042079 85641 $$uhttps://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=310122$$yView this resource
000042079 904__ $$aJournal article
000042079 980__ $$aBIB