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000041788 022__ $$a2029-4921
000041788 040__ $$aSzGeWIPO$$beng$$erda
000041788 041__ $$aeng
000041788 1001_ $$aGao, Jie
000041788 1001_ $$aLiang, Zhilei
000041788 1001_ $$aShang, Jennifer
000041788 1001_ $$aXu, Zeshui
000041788 24503 $$aRemanufacturing with patented technique royalty under asymmetric information and uncertain markets
000041788 264_1 $$aVilnius, Lithuania :$$bVilnius Gedinimas Technical University,$$c2020.
000041788 300__ $$a22 pages
000041788 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
000041788 337__ $$aunmediated$$bn$$2rdamedia
000041788 338__ $$avolume$$bnc$$2rdacarrier
000041788 500__ $$aThis resource was extracted from the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ)
000041788 520__ $$aWe study a dual-channel recycling closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) and investigate the royalty strategy involving cost-reducing technique for remanufacturing patented products. Facing information asymmetry and market uncertainty, we address the problem where the patent licensor (manufacturer) and licensee (remanufacturer) simultaneously compete in the sales market and the recycling market. We examine the optimal decisions of a decentralized CLSC (D-CLSC) with the manufacturer being the Stackelberg leader. Numerical examples are used to demonstrate how the patented technology (cost-reducing technique) affects the channel players’ behaviors and how to identify the optimal royalty fee. Based on the theoretical derivation and the numerical outcomes, we find that regardless of the CLSC structure (centralized or decentralized), the take-back prices and the total profits will rise with the increase of savings from the licensed technology. In the D-CLSC, (i) the expected profits of the manufacturer and the remanufacturer as well as the royalty fee will also rise with the savings from the licensed technology. (ii) In addition, the wholesale price, retail price, take-back prices, as well as the royalty fee will rise with the degree of information asymmetry. But the retailer’s expected profit will decline. (iii) Finally, the expected profit of the manufacturer will rise with the demand uncertainty and the return uncertainty. For the remanufacturer, this trend is not obvious. Our research provides guidance to resolve conflicts and intellectual property disputes between the original manufacturer and the remanufacturer of the patented product. First published online 21 June 2019
000041788 525__ $$aPublished in : Technological and Economic Development of Economy, vol. 26, no. 3 (2020), pp. 599-620.
000041788 650_0 $$aSocial sciences$$xIndustries$$xLand use
000041788 650_0 $$aLabor$$xEconomic growth$$xDevelopment
000041788 650_0 $$aSocial sciences$$xCommerce$$xBusiness
000041788 85641 $$uhttps://doaj.org/article/01fadd5d7fc24c9787a73f3ffc71b1dc$$yView this resource
000041788 904__ $$aJournal article
000041788 980__ $$aBIB