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000024931 008__ 080201s2008    xx |||||r|||| 00| 0 eng d
000024931 035__ $$a(wipo)0
000024931 035__ $$a(OCoLC)1158571496
000024931 040__ $$aSzGeWIPO$$beng$$erda$$cSzGeWIPO$$dCaBNVSL
000024931 041__ $$aeng
000024931 043__ $$ae------
000024931 050_4 $$aK21$$b.S85
000024931 08204 $$a343.072105$$220
000024931 084__ $$a37$$qCH
000024931 1001_ $$aBoscheck, Ralf.
000024931 24510 $$aConstraining Drug Supply Product Positioning, Patent Protection and Regulatory Standards.
000024931 264_1 $$a[Place of publication not identified] :$$b[Kluwer Law International (Alphen aan den Rijn, Países Bajos)],$$c2008.
000024931 300__ $$a1 volume ([13] pages) ;$$c[28] cm.
000024931 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
000024931 337__ $$aunmediated$$bn$$2rdamedia
000024931 338__ $$avolume$$bnc$$2rdacarrier
000024931 4901_ $$aWorld Competition,$$x1011-4548 ;$$vVolume 31, Issue 4 (485 – 498), 2008
000024931 520__ $$aOn both sides of the Atlantic, fast growing drug expenditures and an apparent slow–down in the introduction of new pharmaceutical compounds and generics had rekindled antitrust concerns. Yet while the EU Commission was entering largely uncharted territory, US authorities seemed guided by relevant legislation and case law that has no equivalent in Europe. Still, the US experience so far also shows that public outcries over high–profi le cases are no substitute for a dispassionate assessment of conflicting incentives, inconsistent regulatory standards and essential welfare trade–offs. In fact, it suggests the need to reconsider fundamental policy options and to establish efficient rules so as to ensure a competitive supply of innovative drugs. Contemplating the US experience, this article is organised in five parts. By way of introduction, Part I links US healthcare expenditures, drug research costs and elements of drug regulation and reimbursement to identify four corporate imperatives for product positioning and life–cycle management. Part II focuses on the economics of innovation and intellectual property rights and the need to challenge patents. Part III outlines the structure of the Hatch–Waxman Act, intended to speed up generic substitution, and discusses the evolution of US court decisions on patent settlements in the wake of it. Part IV offers some considerations for modifying the application of Hatch–Waxman rules as well as the processes for contesting patents and pharmaceutical product markets. Part V sums up and links back to the current EU initiative
000024931 650_0 $$aAntitrust law (International law)
000024931 650_0 $$aForeign trade regulation.
000024931 650_0 $$aCompetition, Unfair.
000024931 650_0 $$aCompetition, International.
000024931 650_0 $$aPatents$$zEurope.
000024931 650_4 $$aPharmaceutical Patents$$xUnited States$$zEurope
000024931 650_4 $$aPharmaceutical Industry
000024931 650_4 $$aAntitrust Law
000024931 650_6 $$aConcurrence$$xDroit.
000024931 650_6 $$aCommerce extérieur$$xRéglementation.
000024931 650_6 $$aConcurrence internationale.
000024931 651_0 $$aEurope$$xCommerce$$xLaw and legislation.
000024931 651_0 $$aUnited States$$xCommerce$$xLaw and legislation.
000024931 903__ $$aWorld Competition ;$$vVolume 31, Issue 4 (485 – 498), 2008
000024931 904__ $$aJournal article
000024931 942__ $$cART$$jCH 37 Dec 2008 Vol 31 No 4$$2ddc
000024931 952__ $$w2009-02-09$$p2009-0169$$u38711$$bMAIN$$10$$kCH 37$$v2009-02-09$$70$$cMian Library$$yART
000024931 980__ $$aBIB
000024931 999__ $$c27241$$d27241